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Abstract
We make the case for investigating the gap between the potential and the actual level of
production, and review contributions that point to the reduced power of standard policy in-
struments in presence of a prolonged gap. We also highlight di¢ culties in measuring where an
economy stands relative to its potential. We review links between human capital accumulation
and technology, and sketch a basic Schumpeterian model that puts at the center stage of the
growth process investments in innovation and the foundation of new rms, arguably two key
sources of growth that could revitalize the faltering European Economies. The gap between the
short and long run behavior is illustrated through quantitative experiments.
1 Introduction
The relationship between potential growth and output gap has been recently debated with great
intensity both in academic and policy circles. Recently, Alvin Hansens hypothesis of secular
stagnationin advanced countries has been revived by Larry Summers and by Robert Gordon who
have identied a number of weaknesses on the demand side and the supply side of the economy,
respectively.1 On the one hand, a savings glut puts downward pressure on the interest rate, making
the yield on future capital rather low and therefore limiting future demand. On the other hand,
the recent wave of innovations would not compete with electricity, indoor plumbing and internal
combustion in terms of producing a surge in productivity and in standards of living; coupled with
population ageing, rising inequality, educational mismatch and high public debt ratios (Gordons
four headwinds), lack of strong technical progress in the future would lead to future low economic
growth. Although potential growth is not strictly similar to future economic growth, for they can
apply to di¤erent horizons (the mid-run for the former and the long-run for the latter), the revival
Correspondence: Maurizio Iacopetta, 65 Rue F. Dostoïevski, 06902 Valbonne, France; Tel.: +33 (4)89737107;
E-mail: maurizio.iacopetta@sciencespo.fr. This project has received funding from the European Unions Seventh
Framework Programme for research, technological development and demonstration under grant agreement no 320278
(RASTANEWS). We beneted from discussions with Pietro Peretto and Francesco Saraceno. All remaining errors
are ours.
1Their most recent contributions can be found in a Voxeu ebook edited by Teulings and Baldwin (2014).
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of economic thinking about secular stagnationcannot be entirely absent from the reection on
the determinants of potential growth.
In the European Union (EU), new scal rules embedded in the Fiscal compact and the revision
of the Stability and Growth Pact introduced targets on public spending and cyclically-adjusted
decits; by denition, they require a precise assessment of the gap between actual and potential
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), i.e. the output gap. For instance, if the output gap is close to
zero in an EU member state, the whole public decit that remains in this country is a structural
one; if it exceeds the limit of 0.5% of GDP, the Fiscal compact requires that the country actively
endeavors to reduce public spending and/or raise taxes. Quite automatically, it appears that the
output gap can be made instrumental to the choice of the optimal scal strategy, a very important
debate in the EU and the Eurozone.
We believe that there are at least three reasons why the concept of potential growth is important.
First, as it emerges from these debates, potential growth gives an overview of the long-run growth
of the supply side of the economy, and thus gives an outlook of the future strengths or weaknesses
of an economy and requires studying the di¤erent constraints placed on future supply.
Second, the di¤erence between the actual output and the future output gives information on
the economy in the short run. If actual output is below its potential level, the economy runs with
over- capacities and can be expected to grow faster, unless the demand side remains weak. An
analogy with the situation of the Euro area after the global nancial crisis can be made: although
actual GDP has remained below its potential in Europe since 2009 according to OECD estimates,
actual economic growth has not resumed. This may have been caused by the constraints on supply
in the short run and/or by the use of economic policies, which is the third reason for interest in
the concept of potential growth.
Monetary policy is usually supposed to react to the gap between actual GDP and potential GDP,
according to the famous Taylor (1993) rule, while scal policy does as well, under the heading of
"automatic stabilizers". If actual GDP is below its potential, the nominal interest rate is set at a
lower level by the central bank, while current spending and tax receipts are given some leeway to
grow, for the former, and to decrease, for the latter, hence producing a rise in the public decit.
Going back to the analogy above, once the nominal interest rate has hit its lower bound, the
economy can be stuck in a so-called "liquidity-trap" that makes it impossible to boost demand and
make it converge towards future potential output. As for scal policy, it can be made ine¢ cient if,
prior to a crisis on demand, automatic stabilizers have not been su¢ ciently developed, or if they
have been sacriced to reduce the size of governments via lower spending, including social ones,
and lower tax rates (Creel and Saraceno, 2010).
The list of factors that the literature has proposed as key determinants for long run growth is
long; yet there is a consensus that the real challenge is setting up the right incentives for invest-
ments and in understanding the correct balance across di¤erent types of investments. Here with
investments we mean not only resources devoted to the accumulation of physical capital, but also
to human capital as well as to technology. In fact, a view, which goes as far back as Arrow (1966),
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sees investment and the adoption of new technology as being two sides of the same coin.
The need to coordinate investments in human capital and technology was made sometimes
ago by Goldin and Katz in their book "The Race between Education and Technology". Their
empirical work is based on the US economic time-series, but their arguments are fairly general.
Their rst point is just a reassessment of what many others, chief among them Gary Becker, had
found earlier: Human capital is a central determinant of economic growth. But they also document
how investments in human capital played a major equalizing role in the US. Therefore, a slowdown
in the accumulation of human capital, as it has been observed in some Euro countries, could have
a negative e¤ect on wage inequality. In fact, the most compelling observation of their work, which
bears a lot of relevance for the future of growth in Europe, is the erosion of the forces that had fueled
the rapid growth of education in the US. Conversely, following a tradition initiated by Tinbergen,
they claim that technology tends to be skill-biased. Therefore, moments of rapid technological
progress tend to widen inequality among skill groups unless it is countered by increases in the
supply of human capital.
Although increasing the supply and quality of human capital is a way of ensuring more rapid
and more equitable growth, a potential trade-o¤ between inequality and growth remains if human
capital accumulation is matched with new technologies. Specically, if new technologies replace
tasks previously performed by middle skilled workers and are also expanding the set of tasks that
high skill workers can perform, policy makers should be paying more attention to the top of the
human capital distribution. Acemoglu and Autor (2002) use this observation to lend support to
elitismof educational institutions.
A related question is how education can promote the creation, accumulation and di¤usion
of knowledge across individuals along the dimensions of space and time. Workers benet from
being in a dense, skilled, labor market. Productivity-enhancing external benets of labor markets
are often called human capital externalities, knowledge spillover e¤ects, learning externalities, or
labor market local agglomeration economies. Uncompensated externalities from aggregate human
capital stock have long been considered one of the important forces of economic growth (Romer
(1986), Lucas (1988)). Further, local human capital externalities are considered to be one of the
predominant reasons for the existence of cities and urban endogenous growth.
In particular, one class of growth theories (Romer (1986), Lucas (1988, 2004), Tamura (1991),
Parente and Prescott (1994), Peretto (1998)), features externalities in the accumulation of knowl-
edge possessed by rms or by workers. Another class of growth models (Rivera-Batiz and Romer
(1991) Romer (1994) Kortum (1997)) features externalities from the introduction of new goods, in
the form of surplus to consumers, to rms or to both. Other theories combine knowledge exter-
nalities and new good externalities ((Stokey (1988, 1991) Romer (1990) Aghion and Howitt (1992)
Eaton and Kortum (1996), Howitt (1999, 2000)), Peretto (1998)). Finally, some important growth
theories include no externalities at all (Jones and Manuelli (1990) Rebelo (1991) Acemoglu and
Ventura (2002)). The evidence suggests that models with no externalities cannot explain a number
of empirical patterns. Firm data, wage data, and housing or land price data have been used to
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test human capital externalities. Firm data requires a broad set of control variables to separate it
from other sources of benets that rms obtain from being close to each other, including forward
or backward linkages, input sharing, and natural advantages. Land prices usually are not directly
observable. Estimating hedonic housing models to infer human capital externalities is reasonable,
but it omits information on individual workers. Other indirect methods use patent citation data
to study the geographical localization of knowledge spillovers.
The rst-generation endogenous growth models feature a positive relation between aggregate
market size and growth that results in a positive relation between the scale of aggregate economic
activity and the growth rate of income per capita. Several contributions proposed solutions based
on product proliferation: Dinopoulos and Thompson (1998), Young (1998), and Howitt (1999).
Aghion and Howitt (1998, 2006), Dinopoulos and Thompson (1999), Jones (1999), Peretto and
Smulders (2002) for reviews of the various approaches and of the early empirical evidence. This
version of Schumpeterian theory has recently received empirical support in Ha and Howitt (2007),
Laincz and Peretto (2006), Sedgley (2006), Madsen (2008) and Ulku (2007).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 review the main pitfalls of
potential growth estimates. Section 4 overviews the various ways in which measures of public
policy are considered in growth models. Sections 4 and 5 sketch a Schumpeterian model giving
some insights on the consequences of tax policies and subsidies on potential output. Section 6
concludes.
2 Measurement
Determining potential growth and potential output is denitely a crucial task in order to gure out
the requirement of adopting economic policies and to assess their consequences. The requirement of
implementing a scal and/or a monetary policy depends on the output gap: economic policies may
be e¤ective only insofar as the out- put gap is negative, otherwise they will prove "excessive" as they
will have only nominal e¤ects. Consequences of economic policies thus also depend on the output
gap: increasing scal decits or reducing nominal interest rates for stabilization purposes when the
potential output is below the actual output will prove inationary and ine¢ cient. Potential output
and potential growth also convey key information: high potential growth may attract long-term
capital ows and facilitate the vertical specialization of a domestic economy.
Potential output and the ensuing output gap are widely used by policy makers, and are thus
crucial for designing an adequate if not optimal economic policy. There are two very di¤erent con-
cepts of potential output. Some (semi-structural) methods mix them, but in general no consensus
has arisen so far as regards a unique, uncontroversial estimation methodology.
From a statistical point of view, potential output is computed as the trend or smooth com-
ponent of actual GDP series. The underlying concept is thus totally disconnected from a specic
economic theory and cannot explain the determinants of potential output: by construction, actual
GDP smoothly uctuates around potential output in the mid-run. If economic rationale prevails,
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potential output is generally said to be dened as the level of output consistent with a stable in-
ation rate. More precisely, it is the "sustainable aggregate supply capabilities of an economy, as
determined by the structure of production, the state of technology and the available inputs" (ECB,
2000).
Assessing potential output is denitely not straightforward as potential output is not "observ-
able". Estimation techniques have been manifold in the past. On the one hand, for those economists
who acknowledged the statistical view of potential output, various trend and univariate (or multi-
variate) methods were proposed: potential output was considered as a linear trend component of
actual output , but the trend component could also be extracted by a lter (the Hodrick-Prescott
(HP), the Baxter-King lter or the Kalman lter). On the other hand, for those economists who
acknowledged an economic view of potential output, a second type of methodology- the production
function approach - has given the possibility of identifying the various factors contributing to poten-
tial growth. Finally, recent empirical papers propose to combine multivariate ltering techniques
with the production-function approach, whereas some others draw on VAR models to extract the
output gap.
All types of estimation methodology have their advantages and drawbacks. Statistical methods
are easy to implement but since they draw extensively on past observations of actual output, they
do not give information on its determinants (see Cogley and Nason, 1995, Canova, 1998, and Claus,
2003). Potential output is dened as the permanent component of actual output, usually identied
as the supply component, whereas the output gap is dened as the temporary deviation from the
trend, usually identied as the demand component. As these estimates depend on past statistical
information, without a structural model, they cannot serve the purpose of forecasting potential
output or potential growth. Moreover, ltering methods are confronted with the end-of-period
problem which creates instability of estimates. Rather than univariate lters, multivariate lters
have been introduced in the literature (Kuttner, 1994). For instance, Laxton and Tetlow (1992)
recommended complementing the Hodrick-Prescott lter with Phillips curve and Okuns law rela-
tionships, thus leading to semi-structural specications of the output gap. However, this approach
has several shortcomings: it requires introducing some priors on the relationships; some misspec-
ications can produce unpredictable outcomes, which can explain the poor real-time performance
of this approach; and the contribution of the economic variables to the estimated gap can be very
weak (Borio et al., 2014). For these reasons, Borio et al. (2014) have recently proposed a parsi-
monious multivariate lter approach which improves the real-time performance of their estimated
output gap on US data with the introduction of nancial variables.
Non-statistical structural methods rely on a specic economic theory and identify explicitly
the factors that are driving economic growth: they can be used for forecasting purposes. More-
over, they are widely used by international institutions (OECD, IMF, etc.) and can be used for
comparison purposes. The production-function approach was recommended by the EU Economic
Policy Committee (EPC, 2001). Cotis et al. (2004) note that this approach should be the preferred
method for estimating potential output in Europe as it is, among the array of available methods,
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the most consistent with policy priority, namely achieving structural long-term targets like those
induced by the Lisbon Summit (the target of a trend growth of 3 per cent per year over a decade).
In order to meet this target, it remains that it is of the uppermost importance to know clearly which
type of structural reforms in labor, product and capital markets is likely to drive future economic
growth. Nevertheless, the production-function approach is not devoid of strong drawbacks: rstly,
the appropriate form (Cobb-Douglas, CES, etc.) of the production function has to be chosen but
no uncontroversial method can denitely discriminate between di¤erent specications. Secondly,
structural changes like those arising from a productivity shock are di¢ cult to incorporate in stable
estimated production functions. This is particularly important after a shock to the economy has
occurred: can it be said that the global nancial crisis has had long lasting negative e¤ects on pro-
ductivity, which would mean a permanent decrease in potential output all over the industrialized
countries? Thirdly, this approach raises the issue of how to measure unobservable variables like
total factor productivity (TFP) or the equilibrium (or natural) level of unemployment. As such,
data on the stocks of labor and capital may be of poor quality to implement reliable estimations
of production functions.
It is highly probable that the reliance on total factor productivity (TFP) as a measure of
technical progress is quite heavily biased by measurement errors. Both inputs are at stake. As for
labor, the growth in labor productivity can be broken into three components: an increase in capital
input per hour worked (or capital deepening), a rise in the growth of TFP or output per unit of
input, and an increase in labor quality, labor input per hour worked, due to a shift toward better
educated and more experienced labor force.
On labor quality, three elements are noteworthy. Firstly, it is very likely that the quality of
the labor force has to do with that of education: in some countries, mostly European ones, human
capital is resulting from public involvement in providing education, hence from some part of public
expenditures. This would mean that those expenditures may impinge on labor productivity and,
consequently, on potential output. Secondly, the relationship between labor quality and employ-
ment quality has to be somewhat scrutinized: the changing organization of work after the decay
of Taylorism has dramatically deteriorated safety and health of working people. Askenazy (2004)
) argues that cumulative trauma disorders were highly and positively correlated with innovative
organization of work in the USA between 1984 and 1994 , and this would have been the case also
in European countries since the beginning of the 1990s. The lower overall quality of employment
may impinge on labor productivity and on potential output. Thirdly, labor quality is dependent on
the actual level of unemployment: potential output thus depends on e¤ective output. Long-lasting
unemployment is unfavorable to labor quality as it pushes some unemployed workers to quit the
labor market via early retirement schemes: the average skill of the labor force then drops auto-
matically. High unemployment is also unfavorable to labor quality as it discourages the young and
married women (generally with kids) to try to enter on the labor market. In times of crisis, these
elements gain importance in trying to assess the future potential output of an economy.
As for capital, two major issues are at stake. Firstly, it has been shown (see Musso, 2004) that
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the measurement of TFP is very sensitive to the assumption of a constant lifespan of equipment.
The acceleration of capital obsolescence led to overestimating the TFP slowdown in the USA
between 1970 and 1995; and this acceleration was mainly due to the rise in the rhythm of technical
progress and in the rhythm of di¤usion of innovations. Secondly, adjusting prices of capital goods
to better take into account the evolution in the quality of equipment (following Gordon, 1990) also
drastically limits the contribution of TFP to potential growth and, conversely, accentuate the role
of capital accumulation.
Two striking results emerge from estimations of potential growth and the output gap. First, the
sensitiveness of estimations to the chosen methodology can be quite large. Lequien and Montaut
(2014) compare, on French and Eurozone data, potential growth and the output gap stemming
from four approaches: two structural, one semi-structural and one related to principal component
analysis. They conclude that potential growth in the Eurozone in 2012 lay in the range [0.2; 1]
and the output gap in the range [-2.7; -1.5]. In terms of benchmark Taylor-rule monetary policy,
a di¤erence of 1.2 in the output gap means a change of 60 basis points in the nominal interest
rate, whereas according to a rule-of-thumb for the computation of automatic stabilizers, the same
di¤erence makes a change of 0.6 percent of GDP in the decit. Second, estimations of potential
growth uctuate from one year to another and the reason behind cannot always be attributed to a
sharp international crisis. Lequien and Montaut (2014) show that under the structural approach,
potential growth in France was 2.4 in 2000, 2.1 in 2002, 1.7 in 2006 although the global nancial
had not already started. These variations seem at odds with the estimation of long run growth.
Finally, it is noteworthy that some empirical papers propose combining multivariate ltering
techniques with the production-function approach. This methodology thus combines a model-
based approach to estimate potential output with explicit statistical assumptions concerning the
estimation of the potential values of the components of the production function. Unfortunately,
those sophisticated techniques do not help to discriminate between di¤erent specications (Cobb-
Douglas, translog, etc.) of the production function and may therefore remain highly sensitive to
the chosen specication.
As for the SVAR approach, it combines an empirical model with long-run restrictions in the vein
of Blanchard and Quah (1989). This method requires fewer restrictions on the parameters than
a multivariate lter; it helps to overcome the instability of the estimated gap near the end of the
sample; and it is exible enough to permit an investigation of the incidence of the foreign sector on
domestic potential output (Claus, 2003). Moreover, this approach can be used for forecast purposes
(Cesaroni, 2008). The usual drawback of this method relates to the identication of supply and
demand shocks and its incidence on the relationship between the output gap and potential output
(Balfoussias, 2008). The former stems from the demand side, whereas the latter derives from
the supply side. By assumption, the identication procedure poses a restriction on the long-run
impact of a demand shock: it is nil. Consequently, supply and demand shocks are assumed to be
uncorrelated; hence, the output gap and potential output are uncorrelated as well, which makes
little sense, at least in the short run.
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3 Delays
The methodology surrounding the estimation of potential output crucially depends on the time
horizon: in the short run, the capital stock is assumed constant and therefore, potential output
only depends on the maximum utilization of inputs - capital and labor. Ination, which ultimately
reveals a positive output gap, stems from the rise of actual utilization rates towards their maximum;
therefore, the ination rate is crucial in designing the maximum utilization rate of inputs: once it is
growing, one can say that the gap between the actual and maximum rate has narrowed. However,
the degree of acceptance of ination in the economy is instrumental in the design of potential
output (Le Bihan et al, 1997; Passet et al., 1997). If the aversion towards ination is low, public
authorities (governments, central banks) will not react toughly; a higher degree of acceptance of
ination will lead to higher growth in the short run, hence to higher potential growth. In contrast,
if the aversion towards ination is high, public authorities will react toughly: actual and potential
growth will be lower than in the former case. As a consequence, assuming a stable potential output
in the short run requires assuming that the aversion towards ination is known and constant over
time.
As European economies have moved from low to strong aversion vis-à-vis ination since the
mid-Eighties, it can be inferred that EU potential output may well have been underestimated ever
since. Imagine a rise in the ination rate produced by a temporary surge of investment, possibly
inducing innovations. Under strong aversion towards ination, this ination hike triggers a tough
monetary reaction which not only curbs ination but also the future innovation and future supply
of goods.
Moreover, the relatively inertial behavior of European policy makers after economic shocks
could be attributable to a social norm (Fitoussi and Le Cacheux, 2005): a lower aversion vis-à-vis
inequalities would tend to let public authorities accept a higher natural rate of unemployment than
in the Seventies.
In the mid-run, potential output depends on the speed of and extent to which capital is accu-
mulated. Technical progress is no longer considered as a constant data and its determinants have to
be assessed. Measuring the dynamics of capital accumulation and the di¤usion and determinants
of technical progress remains a major theoretical, methodological and empirical issue.
4 Endogenous Growth and Economic Policies
The neoclassical growth model à la Solow states that actual growth per capita is conditional on
capital and labor accumulation and on exogenous technological progress. Assuming decreasing
returns to scale, output growth equals that of the population plus technical progress in the long
run. Within this framework, it is straightforward that economic policies are devoid of an impact
on growth per capita in a situation in which the economy is in steady state. Nevertheless, a large
body of literature has used the Solow model as a framework to understand some rst order e¤ects
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of tax and spending policies. In fact, if the steady state level of capital relative to output is pushed
forward, for instance by a subsidy to investment, or by a policy of forced saving, the economy
will exhibit positive although declining growth for many years after the implementation of the
policy. Piketty (2014) uses for instance the Solow model as the conceptual framework to explain
the dynamics of the wealth over income ratio and its potential e¤ect on inequality.
The so-called "New" growth theory acknowledges the endogenous nature of technical progress
and assigns a key role to scal policy as a determinant of long-run economic growth. The new
theory of endogenous growth has introduced many new elements potentially under the inuence
of the government. Therefore, it represents a richer conceptual framework to evaluate European
economic policies.
A line of research has emphasized the role of producersmarket power both as a driver for
innovation, but also as a possible source of welfare losses for consumers. The classic work of Romer
(1990) and of Aghion and Howitt (1992), which span a large body of literature on growth, assume
that rms enter the market because of the prospect of monopolistic extraction.
A second line of research took the road of human capital. Although in the initial work of Lucas
(1988) education is seen an investment of individuals, the subsequent literature has amended the
model to allow for public spending in education (see for instance Glomm and Kaganovich (2003)).
Whether human capital is a key element of long run growth is still under scrutiny. In particular,
the empirical evidence presented in Benhabib and Spiegel (1994), which implies that the initial
level of human capital but not its growth rate is positively linked to long run income growth, is
still largely unchallenged.
Both approaches assume some sorts of externality as an ingredient for long run growth. In the
technological-type of progress models, it is the stock of knowledge developed by other rms. In the
human capital knowledge is social learning. In either case, the conclusion is that the decentralized
market does not invest enough in knowledge.
A third line of research emphasizes the role of public capital. An early formalization of this ap-
proach is presented in Barro (1990). Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) considers three types of public
capital: one is a pure public good, that is, it has the characteristic of being non-rival and non-
excludable. A second one is a private good (rival and excludable) but provided by the government.
A third type of is a good subject to congestion non-rival when it is used by a few individuals, but
rival when the intensity of its uses goes over a certain limit. In two out of the three cases, that is
in the cases where public capital has the characteristic of being non-rival, the provision by the gov-
ernment has unambiguous positive e¤ects on growth. In this context, public intervention nancing
fundamental research, infrastructures, etc., may substantially enhance economic growth above the
steady-state compatible with the assumption that goods and labor markets clear. Unfortunately,
empirical evidence on the links between public capital and economic growth is still debatable (see
Romp and de Haan, 2007). According to Bom and Ligthart (2009) and their meta-analysis on this
topic however, the output elasticity of public capital spending is always positive.
The rst generation of endogenous growth model considered two types of benets derived from
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technological progress: One is due to the varietyexpansion, that is the idea that the production
process becomes more e¢ cient with a greater variety of good, or that the individuals utility in-
creases as the consumption options expands. A second is the improvement in e¢ ciency within an
existing line of production, which can be driven either by incumbent rms or by new entrants. A
more recent line of research has merged these two aspects of vertical and horizontal innovation.
The question is not anymore what are the factors that can accelerate growth, but how public policy
a¤ects the balance between the various growth channels. In the remaining part of the paper we
elaborate more formally on the tax policies implications of this more recent body of literature.
5 Dynamics of the Industry and Potential Growth
One way of interpreting the gap between the current and the potential GDP is that the economy is
operating at a scale below the long run one. In this section we use a simple Schumpeterian growth
model to show the adjustment processes that follows a number of policy measures, including taxes
and R&D subsidies, when the dynamics are driven by the entry of new rms and by the rms
investment decisions. We abstract from monetary policy. We consider routine-type of innovation
carried out by incumbent rms rather than vertical innovation pushed forward by outsiders (see
Aghion and Howitt (2005) for a review of this line of research). The experiments are inspired by
Iacopetta and Peretto (2014).
5.1 Baseline model
In a closed economy there is a large number of rms operating in perfect competition that produce a
consumption good by using a variety of non-durable intermediate goods and unskilled labor. There
is no neoclassical physical capital. Intermediate good rms improve the quality of their production
by investing systematically in innovation. All variables are functions of (continuous) time but to
simplify the notation we omit the time argument unless necessary to avoid confusion. The economy
is populated by a continuum of households of mass L = L0et, L0  1. A household supplies labor
and trades assets in competitive markets.
Households. The representative household has preferences
U (t) =
Z 1
t
L(s)e (s t) log c(s)ds;  >   0 (1)
where t is the point in time when the household makes decisions,  is the individual discount rate,
and c is per capita consumption. Since each household is endowed with one unit of time, L is
the total endowment of labor. Each household supplies labor inelastically and thus faces the ow
budget constraint (in per capita terms)
_a = (r   )a+ w   c; (2)
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where a is assets holding, r is the rate of return on assets and w is the wage. The intertemporal
consumption plan that maximizes (1) subject to (2) consists of the Euler equation
_c
c
= r   ; (3)
the budget constraint (2) and the usual boundary conditions.
Final producers. There are J nal good rms. A competitive representative rm j produces a
nal good Yj that can be consumed, used to produce intermediate goods, invested in the improve-
ment of the quality of existing intermediate goods, or invested in the creation of new intermediate
goods. The nal good is the numeraire so its price is PY  1. Final good rm j produce according
to the following technology
Yj =
Z N
0
Xi;j

Zi Z
1  Lj
N1 
(1 )
di; 0 < ;  < 1 (4)
where N is the mass of intermediate goods, Xi;j is the quantity of intermediate good i, and Lj is
labor. Quality is the ability of a good to raise the productivity of the other factors: the contribution
of good i depends on its own quality, Zi, and on the average quality, Z =
R N
0 (Zi=N) di, of interme-
diate goods. Social returns to quality are equal to 1. The parameter  is instead the social returns
to variety. The rst-order conditions for the prot maximization problem of the nal producer
yield that each intermediate producer faces the demand curve
Xij =


Pi
 1
1 
Zi Z
1  Lj
N1 
; (5)
where Pi is the price of intermediate good i. The rst-order conditions then yield that the nal
producer pays total compensationZ N
0
PiXijdi = Yj and wLj = (1  )Yj (6)
to intermediate goods and labor suppliers, respectively. Because households derive no utility from
leisure, the overall supply of labor is the same as the size of the population:
R J
0 Ljdj = L. Therefore,
Xi =


Pi
 1
1 
Zi Z
1  L
N1 
; (7)
and Z N
0
PiXidi = Y and wL = (1  )Y
where Xi =
R J
0 Xijdj and Y =
R J
0 Yjdj.
Intermediate producers. The typical rm producing an intermediate good i operates a technol-
ogy that requires one unit of nal good per unit of intermediate good and a xed operating cost
Zi Z
1 , also in units of nal good. The rm can increase the quality of its intermediate good
according to the technology
_Zi = Ii; (8)
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where Ii is investment in quality, in units of nal good. Using (7), the rms gross prot (i.e., the
prot before investment expenditure) is
Gi =
"
(Pi   1)


Pi
 1
1  L
N1 
  
#
Zi Z
1 : (9)
At time t, the intermediate rm would choose for s 2 [t;1) paths of the products price, Pi (s) and
investment, Ii (s), so to maximize
Vi (t) =
Z 1
t
e 
R s
t r(v)dv [i(s)  Ii (s)] ds (10)
subject to (8) and (9), and taking the paths of the interest rate, r (s), and of average quality, Z (s),
as given.
Next, we need to specify the process of formation of intermediate rms. At time t, a household
member who wants to found a new rm has to sink X (t) units of nal good. Because of this sunk
cost, the new rm cannot supply an existing good in Bertrand competition with the incumbent
monopolist but must introduce a new good that expands product variety. New rms enter at the
average quality level, and therefore at average size (this simplifying assumption preserves symmetry
of equilibrium at all times).
5.1.1 Optimal innovation and the entry decision
The net prot generated by an intermediate rm is
i  (Pi   1)Xi   Zi Z1    Ii: (11)
Therefore, the optimal price and the optimal path of innovation are pinned, the rst-order condi-
tions of the associated Hamiltonian (not reported) with respect to Pi, Ii, Zi lead to the following
monopolistic price and return to investment in quality
Pi =
1

; (12)
rZ = 
"
1

  1

Xi
Zi
  

Z
Zi
1 #
: (13)
In a later extension of this model we will consider a situation in which the rm internalizes the
e¤ects that its pricing decisions has on its share of the market. As in most endogenous growth
model with market power, the rate of return on innovation is increasing in the mark-up, for a given
level of production Xi. However in this environment with endogenous entry, the change in mark up
triggers general equilibrium e¤ects that can actually bring down the growth rate of the economy.
The free-entry condition is given by
Xi (t)  Vi(t); (14)
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where on the left-hand side is the cost of entry which is assumed to be proportional to the scale of
operation of the rm. Eq. (7) claries that this is also increasing in the state of technological level
of the rm Zi. The right-hand side is the value of the new rm (specied below) dened as
Vi(t) =
Z +1
t
e 
R s
t r(v)dvi(s)ds: (15)
If the expected ow of prots is not large enough to justify sunking Xi (t) there is no entry and
growth is driven only by incumbent rms. Conversely, if entry is protable, because everybody can
attempt to set up a new rm, in equilibrium Eq. (14) holds as an equality.
When entry is protable, condition in Eq. (14) and equation (15) yield
rN =
i
Xi
+
_Xi
Xi
; (16)
This expression shows that the return to entry  i.e., the return to setting up new corporate
entities is given by the dividend price ratio plus capital gains or losses.
5.2 Equilibrium
We now study how the equilibrium conditions drive the allocation of nal output Y between
consumption, production of intermediate goods, innovation and the set up of new rms. We
also look at the evolution over time of the rms market size and of the pace of technological
change. In a rst step we rearrange the ow of nal good j by using the property that PX{j =
Yj and assuming symmetry across rms. We can thus express rms j ow of output as Yj = 

P
 
1  N 1Lj
R N
0 Z

i Z
1 di. From what follows we will impose symmetry across rms, hence
Zi = Z. Hence summing over all nal good producers we obtain
Y =


P
 
1 
NZL; (17)
where Y =
R J
0 Yjdj. The denition of gross prot (9) and equations (13) and (16) show that
the returns to innovation and to entry depend on the quality-adjusted gross cash ow of the rm
(P   1)Xi=Zi  i.e., revenues minus variable production costs, all scaled by quality  since this
is the appropriate measure of protability for rms that spread xed costs, including the cost of
developing quality-improving innovations, over their volume of sales. Scaling by quality is required
to make variables stationary in steady state. Hence, Eqs. (13) and (16) yields the following
expressions for the returns to innovation and to entry:
rZ =  [(P   1)!x  ] ; (18)
rN =
1
!

(P   1)!   + z
x

+
_x
x
+ z: (19)
where !    P  11  , x  L=N1  this will play the role of our state variable, for it proxies the
size of the market captured by each intermediate good rm. The variable and z is the growth
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rate of Z. These two equations show that in equilibrium the return to innovation is given by the
quality-adjusted gross cash ow, which is increasing in labor use in the downstream nal sector
(since production of nal goods drives the demand for intermediate goods) and decreasing in the
mass of rms. It should be clear, however, that from the viewpoint of the managers of incumbent
rms and of the founders of new rms the critical market size variable is total expenditure on
intermediate goods, Y ; the terms L and N enter the calculation of the returns once we want to
trace the general equilibrium determinants of Y .
Finally, we compute assets of this economy that are given by the overall amount of equity shares
of intermediate rms. Therefore, the overall wealth of the households at time t equals
A(t) =
Z N
0
Vi(t)di.
5.3 Dynamics
We can conveniently follow the evolution of the economy through the movements of the state
variable x. Indeed using the households budget constraints, the above denition of assets, and the
free entry condition, and the Euler Equation, one can show that the di¤erential equation of the
consumption output ratio c = C=Y admits only one unstable positive xed point: 1 +(  ) P .
Hence when n and z are both positive the consumption output ratio is constant. Conversely, when
entry is not yet protable one can show that the c = 1 + P (P   1)  +z!x 2. When x is too small
and there is no entry, the consumption ratio is increasing in x because rms earn escalating rents
(uncontested by entrants) from the growing size of the market (recall that we postulate population
growth). Such rents are distributed to the shareholders who consume them. When x is su¢ ciently
high and there is entry, in which case the rents are capped and the consumption ratio is constant.
It is possible to calculate analytically thresholds of x above which innovation and entry are
protable, respectively by setting to zero the left hand side of Eqs. (18) and (19) hold) the level.
Let xZ and xN denote the two thresholds, respectively. Then we have that when x > xZ
z(x) =
((P   1)!x  ) (  !x)  (1  )   
1  !x
(20)
and when x > xN
n(x) =
1
!

(P   1)!   + z (x)
x

  +  (21)
Whether xN is larger or smaller than xZ is of crucial importance in dening the sequence of
development. In what follows we focus on a scenario that seems to accord more with historical
2When there is no entry, total output is used for consumption, intermediate goods, operating cost, and possibly
innovation. Y = C + NX + NZ + zNZ: Noticing that NX = 2Y and that NZ = 1
x
 

P
  
1  Y , we obtain:
1=c+ 2 + (+ z) 1
x
 

P
  
1  .
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evidence: xN < xZ . 3. The denition of x implies that this obeys the di¤erential equation
_x
x
=   (1  )n (x) : (22)
Combining the above expressions for n(x) and _xx one gets
_x
x
= + (1  )   (1  ) 1
!

(P   1)!   
x

:
Therefore, the economy can crosses the threshold for quality innovation in nite time. Intuitively
as the quality-adjusted gross protability of rms, (P   1)X=Z, rises the dissipation of protability
due to entry gains su¢ cient force to induce rms to initiate in-house quality-improving operations.
5.4 The steady state
To rene the intuition on the mechanisms that causes long run changes in this economy, it is useful
to determine the steady state value of the interest rate, the innovation rate, and of the entry rate.
The steady state values will be denoted with an asterix. First, it is easy to observe that for x to
be constant, it must be that
n  
1   (23)
: From the saving behavior of the household we obtain
r = + n + z:
Second, the returns to quality investment and to entry (19) and (18) lead to:
z =  (P   1)!x    (+ n) ; (CI)
z = [(P   1)   (+ n)]!x  : (EI)
After some algebra, we obtain:
x =
(1  )  (+ n)
(1  ) (P   1)   (+ n)


P
  1
1 
; (24)
z =
[+ (+ n)]    (P   1)
(1  ) (P   1)   (+ n) (+ n
) : (25)
3After some algebra one nds that is true as long as

(P   1)   
P
 1
1  xN   
 
  
( P )
1
1  xN
!
< (1  ) +
:
Also some technical conditions are needed for entry xN to be nite and to insure that the resulting equilibrium is
actually a stable Nash equilibrium.
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Table 1: Baseline Case: Parameters Values
Parameters Steady State Values
Production and Entry Households Percentage
       x z n y r
0.16 0.2 0.3 1 13.76 0.035 0.01 17:33 1 1.25 1.25 4.75
5.5 GDP and welfare
To complete the characterization of the model, we examine the e¤ects of corporate governance
frictions on GDP and welfare. Let G denote the GDP of this economy. Subtracting the cost of
intermediate production from the value of nal production and using (7) yields
GDP  G = Y  N (X + Z) =

1  
P

1 +
Z
X

Y =
241  
P
0@1 +  

P
 1
1  x
1A35Y;
where P = 1= (1 + 
) . The term in brackets is increasing in X, and therefore in x, because the
unit cost of production of the typical intermediate rm falls as its scale of operation rises. In steady
state the growth rate of nal output and GDP per capita is 
_Y
Y
!
   = 
1   + z
: (26)
6 Taxes and Subsidies
In this section we introduce taxes on corporate prots, nancial income, labor, and consumption.
We also consider a form of R&D deduction which reduces the intermediate goods rm corporate
tax liabilities. The main objective of this section is to understand how the entry decision and the
incumbent choice of quality improvement is a¤ected by a wide variety of scal policy instruments.
We will assume that the government runs a balanced budget and that taxes are partly or totally
rebated to consumers on the same period they accrue to the government and partly are used to
nance the government activities. We are mostly concerned with the distortionary e¤ects of taxes.
For this reason we treat government spending, when this is positive, as unproductive. Nevertheless
taxes do not have necessarily negative e¤ects on growth, because they may correct monopolistic
distortions. All corporate and nancial taxes, when are rebated to the households are given directly
in form of consumption goods. The household budget constraint is
_a = (1  w)w + (1  a)ra  (1 +  c)c  na+ v
where w, a, and  c are time constant tax rate on labor income, nancial assets, and consumption.
The variable v is the amount of per capita transfers which consists of ww +  cc. For brevity we
consider only one type of tax rate on nancial assets a.4 Each rms tax liability is proportional
4For a distinction between tax rate on capital gains and on distributed dividends in a similar framework, see
Peretto (2007).
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to gross prots:
[(P   1)Xi   Zi   eI]
where 0 <  < 1 and e  0 measures the amount of R&D expenditures that can be deducted.
Hence the rms ow of prot net of taxes is now
N = (1  )[(P   1)Xi   Zi   I]
where  = 1 e1  : The rms value is still dened by (15) as long as  is being replaced with 
N .
Hence,
r =
N
V
+
_V
V
.
Aside from any negative e¤ect on the capital gains, taxes reduce the interest rate by dampening
down the ow of prots.
One can verify that the returns to innovation and to entry become
rZ =


[(P   1)!x  ] (27)
and
rN =
(1  )
!

(P   1)!   + z
x

+
_x
x
+ z: (28)
Intuitively, when the R&D expenditures are fully deductible ( = 1), for a given interest rate,
the pattern of innovation expenditures is not a¤ected by the corporate taxes, for these take away
a constant proportion of prots. Conversely, the return to entry goes down with the corporate tax
rate.
The Euler Equation is clearly a¤ected by the tax on nancial assets:
_c
c
= r(1  a)  .
By combining the three equations and setting _x = 0, and observing that _cc = n + z, one obtains
the CI and SE loci under taxation:
z =
(1  a)

[(P   1)!x  ]  (n+ ): (29)
and
z =
1
a!x+ '
1

f' [(P   1)!x  ]  (n+ )!xg (30)
where '  (1   a)(1   ):A rise in the corporate tax causes a clock-wise rotation of the entre-
preneurial innovation curve (EI): to maintain the same level of innovation rms have to be bigger
in order to spread the cost of innovation across a greater amount of production. It also a¤ects the
corporate innovation (CI) loci because the reduction of the tax base brought about by R&D spend-
ing amounts at saving on taxes. Said it di¤erently, a higher corporate tax is equivalent to a greater
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R&D subsidy (s) which causes an anti-clockwise rotation of the CI curve. As a result level of the
equilibrium innovation rates higher. Intuitively, the corporate taxes have negative distortionary
e¤ects on entry, that slows down the set up of new rms, and a create a positive distortion with
respect to R&D investments. If the entry distortion is su¢ ciently large, rms will have bigger size
in the economy with a higher corporate tax.
The nancial asset tax does not alter directly the R&D subsidy. In this case both margins of
innovation are negatively a¤ected by the tax, implying a clockwise rotation of both loci. Firms
grow bigger, but the net e¤ect on the long run innovation rate is ambiguous.
When n > 0 assets market equilibrium requires
A = NV = NX = 

P
 Y; (31)
which says that the wealth ratio A=Y is constant. This result and the saving schedule (3) allow
us to rewrite the household budget (2) as the following unstable di¤erential equation in c  C=Y
with the same characteristics of the tax-free economy.5
6.1 Taxes and R&D subsidies: Comparative Static
We explore rst the steady state e¤ects of changes in the tax code. The main question we focus
on is the welfare consequences of the introduction of corporate taxes, nancial assets taxes, and
a combination of taxes and R&D subsidies. In order to focus on the distortionary e¤ects of taxes
we assume that the government rebates all the revenues raised by the two taxes, net of any R&D
subsidies, in form of consumption .
A surprising result that emerges is that taxes may be welfare improving, at least when there is no
initial taxation. The distortion introduced by taxes indeed can correct other underlying distortions
to the point of increasing general welfare. For instance, the economy may under invest in innovation,
because rms do not fully internalize the returns of their R&D investments. Traditionally an R&D
subsidy is called upon to ameliorate the issue of suboptimal investment. In this framework, however,
there is an additional and less evident tool that the policy maker can use: make it more costly
for rms to enter the market or make it less protable for households to start-up the creation
of new rms. Such a policy would of course depress the dynamics of the industry, but at the
same time would make relatively more protable to invest in innovation. The total welfare and
growth consequences of a change in the tax policy will depend on the relative strength of these
two phenomena. In what follows we go more into the details of this mechanism. First, we look
at the long run through a number of comparative static illustrations. Then we elaborate on the
adjustment process and on welfare changes.
Before proceeding it is important to clarify that in an economy with taxes two steady state
equilibria may emerge. This is due to the fact that the entry arbitrage condition becomes more
5The consumption-output ratio would depend on the nancial income and corporate taxes if these were partially
rebated to the households. In particular, because rmsprots are not a constant proportion of the output, rebating
corporate taxes would imply that the consumption-output ratio varies with the state variable x.
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and more concave with the introduction of corporate and nancial income taxes. One such a case
is shown in Fig. (6.1). However, only the equilibrium in which the EI line hits the CI line from
below is stable. This is the one on which we focus our attention. Indeed, because our experiments
start with an initial state of the economy in which there are no taxes, this is also the unique steady
state equilibrium.
The introduction of a corporate tax does not alter the rms R&D investment behavior, because
the tax is proportional to the gross prots of the rm. Therefore the CI locus is una¤ected.
Conversely, the reduction of net prots does introduce a distortion in the entry decision causing a
downward shift of the EI curve. In the long run the lower entry rate will lead to greater size, which
tends to make R&D investment more protable. The nal result, is an economy with relatively
fewer rms of greater dimension that invest more into corporate R&D. This result is illustrated in
the top plot of Fig. (6.1).
A tax on the interest earned on assets, has the more ambiguous e¤ects because it alters down-
wards both arbitrage condition. Because the net return on bonds goes down, a lower rate in
innovation is needed to keep the rms internal rate of return in line with outside options. Sim-
ilarly, a lower innovation rate would be enough to keep entry protable. If the CI curve shifts
relatively more, as in the middle plot of Fig. (6.1), in the long run there will be greater investment
in innovation.
The third observation concerns the introduction of R&D subsidies. From the point of view of a
new rm entering the market, this looks like a reduction in the corporate tax liabilities. It is then
not surprising that the CI curve moves in the opposite direction relative to the situation in which
corporate prots are introduced. But also the investment decision is now a¤ected, because the R&D
subsidy is equivalent to a reduction in the cost of innovation. Because both loci move in the same
direction, in principle the nal e¤ect on the innovation rate is ambiguous. Under some standard
parameters, however, the entry condition is a¤ected more signicantly; therefore innovation, in the
long run, accelerates.
6.2 Dynamics
Next we study the e¤ect of corporate and asset taxes on the innovation and on the entry rate. The
corresponding equation of (20) and (21) are
z(x) =
1
r

1  a
1  s ((P   1)!x  )   

l
['((P   1)!   
x
) + (1  a)  ]

(32)
and
n(x) =
1
l

(1  )(1  a)
!

(P   1)!   + (1  s)z(x)
x

+ (1  a)(+ z)  (z + )

; (33)
respectively, where l = (1  a) (1  ) + , and r  1  l ('x + a). The growth rate of x is
still given by (22).
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Figure 1: Multiple Equilibria
Note: Multiple Steady State Equilibria may arise with corporate and nancial income taxes. The plot is
generated under following parameters:
 = 0:25,  = 6;  = 0:95;  = 0:17;  = 0:3;  = 0:2;  = 0:02,  = 0:01,  = 1, a = 0:3,
 = 0:4:The eigenvalue associated to the stable (unstable) equilibrium is -0.38% (0.22%).
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Figure 2: Tax Policy Experiments Comparative Static
Note: The rst and second plot from the top show the long run e¤ect of introducing a corporate and a
nancial income tax into a free-tax economy. In the bottom plot an R&D tax credit is brought from 100 to
120 percent of expendability in an economy that has a corporate tax rate of 10%.
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The government output ratio, G=Y , recipes can also be expressed as a function of the rms
size. Because the sum of the nancial and corporate taxes
G = rAa + [(P   1)Xi   Zi   dI]N .
after some algebra this becomes
G=Y  %(x) = a

[(P   1)!x  ] 
P
+ [(P   1)2   (+ d) 1
x
 

P
 
1 
].
6.3 Welfare
In this section we consider the welfare implications of scal policy. The framework we propose is
that of comparing the welfare of an economy hit by a policy shock against one that stays on its long
run path. As in the previous section we deal with taxes on prots, taxes on nancial income, and
R&D subsidies. Although we allowed for labor and consumption taxes, their welfare implications
are less interesting. Indeed, the absence of the leisure choice does not allow either tax to generate
distortions. In order to make sure that welfare di¤erences are solely due to distortionary e¤ects, in
this section all taxes are rebated to consumers. For simplicity the nancial and corporate taxes are
rebated in form of consumption. Hence no saving decision is taken on these resources. Formally,
the welfare we calculate is on the pattern of (c+g)y, where c and g are ratio of private consumption
and government revenues relative to net output. A common theme in illustrations that follow is
the rebalancing of entrepreneurial and corporate innovation as a result of a policy shock. Because
these tend to act in opposite directions, growth and welfare result can be ambiguous.
Table (2) summarize the long run e¤ect of the proposed experiments as well as the overall
change in welfare. The rst row refers to the benchmark economy where not taxes are levied and
no subsides are in place.
Fig. (6.3) illustrates the impulse responses to the introduction of a 1% tax rate on interest
earnings. Because both margins of innovation are negatively a¤ected, in the short run which
actually can last several decades the tax will slow down entry and corporate innovation. Hence
the tax free economy grows faster. Nevertheless, as over the transition the size of the rm increases,
it becomes more and more protable to invest in R&D. After a while there is a reverse of fortunes
between the two economies. In the current example this happens quite far away in the future,
therefore, welfare, evaluated from the todays point of view, is greater in the tax-free economy.
In a second experiment, shown in Fig. (6.3), we study the introduction of a 1% corporate tax.
In the long run, this shock diverts resources away from entrepreneurial innovation and drives
them towards corporate innovation. Intuitively, because the lower net prot depress the value of
companies, households are more reluctant in establishing new rms. The return of incumbent rms
also goes down for the same reason, but there is an additional e¤ect favoring them. The lower
entry rate, means that the existing rms can grab a larger share of the market. Because of the
larger size, in the long run their rate of innovation is higher.
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Table 2: Baseline Case: Parameters Values
Policy Parameters Steady State Values Welfare
Percentage
 a  x z n y r
0 0 1 17.96 1.75 1.25 2 5.5 -
0 0.01 1 18.06 1.81 1.25 2.06 5.62 0.969
0.01 0 1 18.03 1.84 1.25 2.09 5.59 1.011
0.01 0 1.02 18.03 1.84 1.25 2.09 5.59 1.012
Note: The rst row recalls the steady state values of the economy under the same parameters as in Table
(1). The remaining rows report the long run e¤ects of a change in one or more tax policy parameters. The
last column records the ratio of the households level of welfare after the shock over that before the shock.
In the short run, the size of the rms is given. As a result, the productivity in the nal
good sector will be relatively lower in the tax-economy, because rms can use a smaller array of
intermediate goods. The welfare calculation suggests that the transitional e¤ects associated with
a lower entry rate tend to be weaker than the long run e¤ect due to the acceleration of vertical
innovation: Overall welfare goes up. When R&D subsidies are introduced on the top of corporate
taxes, clearly welfare tends to be greater (6.3).
7 Conclusion
The European economies are thought of being below their potential. Clearly they have been running
at a slower pace than what has been observed in the decades after WWII. There is ample room for
debating the reasons. Some have attributed the current disappointment simply to unreasonable high
expectations fueled by the belief that the new information and communication technologies could
have a long-lasting e¤ect comparable to the dissemination of electricity or steam engines (Gordon).
Others have pointed out that growth may have slowed down in advance economy because of the
changed complementarity between technology and human capital (Goldin and Katz). Scholars
more attentive to the level of income as a determinant of the rms investment are more prone to
attribute the slowdown to a mix of restrictive scal and monetary policy. In reviewing these points
of views we have pointed out the objective di¢ culty in asserting conceptually how far away an
economy is from its potential level of production, and the econometric challenges to estimate such
a gap.
Our review of endogenous growth models poses the basis for studying the most promising
channels through which policy can a¤ect growth. First, most models of technological progress
assume some monopolistic competition and some sorts of knowledge externalities. This means that
there are two types of ine¢ ciencies that in principle can be targeted by public policy: the static
ine¢ ciency of a monopolistic price; the sub-optimal investment in goods that generate knowledge.
Second, growth is driven by a combination of investments by new entrants and by incumbents. An
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Figure 3: Impulse Responses to Financial Income Tax
Note: The gures show the consequences of the introduction of a 1% tax on nancial income (a = 0:01).
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Figure 4: Impulse Responses to Corporate Tax
Note: The plots show the impulse responses to the introduction of a 1% tax rate on corporate prots
( = 0:01).
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Figure 5: Impulse Responses to RD Subsidy
Note: In an economy with a 10% corporate tax rate a 100% tax deduction on R&D spending is introduced
(d = 2)..The dashed lines are the impulses responses.
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active industrial policy that rises the barrier to entry would favor growth-process driven by existing
rms, and would tend to create larger rms. Whether such an industrial policy would be welfare
reducing or augmenting is ambiguous. The conclusion depends mostly on the hardly observable
fact of whether it is more likely that incumbents are more or less likely than new rms to generate
knowledge that spills over in the industry.
As a way to highlight the di¤erence between short and long run growth e¤ects of scal policy
measures we proposed a few illustrations of the propagation mechanisms of shocks to capital and
corporate tax within the framework of a Schumpeterian growth model. A key feature of this class
of models is that growth can be driven by the entry of new rms, and by the accumulation of
knowledge of existing rms. The examples have shown some important asymmetries between the
short and the long run responses to a given policy. In the short run both the entry rate and the
innovation rate are a¤ected. For instance the introduction of a tax on capital income lowers the
entry rate, and therefore gives more market share to existing rms, but it also induces them to
slowdown their investments. As the economy approaches its long run equilibrium, however, the
innovation rate, driven by incumbent rms, goes well beyond the pre-tax economy, whereas the
entry rate converges to the same level. Therefore the sign of the welfare change can be positive or
negative, depending on the length of the transition.
We think that this paper has identied fruitful directions for future research on the links between
potential growth and output gap. It calls for a need to develop a framework in which public and
private investments are linked to human capital formation and the acceptance of new technologies.
A problem with models of potential growth is that they tend to take for granted that new knowledge
and new technologies are immediately available to the public. Therefore the weakness of an economy
tends to be associated with lack of (past) resources allocated to investment in schools and in R&D.
A second problem is that they have little to say about the role of monetary policy, unless it is a
source of substantial macroeconomic instability, and on the welfare consequences of following rules
of thumb in scal policy, as it is now done in the EU.
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